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Abstract
In the last two decades, there has been a global sea change in the theory and practice of central banking. 
The “best practice” now commonly prescribed by the international financial institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as by many prominent economists, is best characterized 
as the “neo-liberal” approach to central banking. The main components of this recipe are: (1) central 
bank independence, (2) a focus on inflation fighting (including adopting formal “inflation targeting”) 
and (3) the use of indirect methods of monetary policy (i.e., short-term interest rates as opposed to 
direct methods such as credit ceilings).
This recipe is dramatically different from the historically dominant theory and practice of central 
banking, not only in the developing world, but, notably, in the now developed countries themselves 
(Epstein, 2007). 
It is now time for a re-assessment of this historical experience. In this paper, I begin to make that 
assessment. I first report on cross-country statistical analysis to assess the impact of measures of 
central bank developmental effort on economic growth. The main findings are that central bank efforts 
to promote private investment can promote economic growth, and that, in general, there is no negative 
relationship between developmental effort and economic growth.
To get more information on central bank developmental effort and economic outcomes, case studies 
will be more useful than cross-country econometrics. This paper presents a set of case studies from 
Latin America and Asia which show that developmental efforts by central banks can have an important 
impact on economic development. The countries studied are: Brazil, China, India, Mexico, the Republic 
of Korea and Thailand.
The paper then describes specific tools and policies that central banks can undertake, in conjunction 
with other institutions to promote development. These include loan guarantees, asset backed reserve 
requirements, direct lending, and capital management techniques. 
This paper argues that one place to look for models is the history of developmental central banks 
and financial policies in both the developed and developing countries. Of course, there is not simple 
return to the past. But there are plenty of models and institutional structures to learn from. The cross-
sectional data presented in this paper suggest that central bank developmental efforts to promote real 
investment does contribute to economic growth, but do not indicate other broad conclusions of success 
or failure. Much is to be learned from country case studies and the implementation of developmental 
tools in concrete circumstances.
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I. Introduction
In the last two decades, there has been a glo-
bal sea change in the theory and practice of central 
banking (Blinder, 1998). The “best practice” now 
commonly prescribed by the international financial 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), as well as by many prominent economists, is 
best characterized as the “neo-liberal” approach to 
central banking. The main components of this recipe 
are: (1) central bank independence, (2) a focus on 
inflation fighting (including adopting formal “infla-
tion targeting”) and (3) the use of indirect methods 
of monetary policy (i.e., short-term interest rates as 
opposed to direct methods such as credit ceilings). 
These principles have far reaching implications. 
Central bank independence implies, first and fore-
most, that the central bank should not be subject to 
pressure from the government to finance government 
activities (deficits). The focus on inflation means that 
the central bank should not be concerned with other 
goals such as promoting full employment, supporting 
industrial policy or allocating credit to sectors of 
special social need, such as housing. Neither should 
the central bank attempt to manage exchange rates 
through monetary policy, and certainly not through 
using controls on capital flows. The pursuit of indirect 
tools of monetary policy means that the central bank 
should not use credit allocation techniques such as 
subsidized interest rates, credit ceilings, and capital 
controls to affect either the quantity or the allocation 
of credit. These tenets are being promoted not only 
in developed countries, but also with great vigour in 
the developing world.
This recipe – no support for the government 
expenditure, reluctance to manage exchange rates 
and opposition to use of capital controls, and a 
refusal to engage in credit allocation policies to 
support economic sectors – is a highly idiosyncratic 
one in the sense that, as a package, it is dramatically 
different from the historically dominant theory and 
practice of central banking, not only in the developing 
world, but, notably, in the now developed countries 
themselves (Epstein, 2007). Throughout the early 
2 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 54
and recent history of central banking in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Continental Europe, 
and elsewhere, financing governments, managing 
exchange rates, and supporting economic sectors by 
using “direct methods” of intervention have been 
among the most important tasks of central banking 
and, indeed, in many cases, were among the reasons 
for their existence. The neo-liberal policy package 
currently proposed, then, is a departure the history 
and dominant practice of central banking throughout 
most of its history.
For developing countries, this change has been, 
perhaps, the most dramatic. After the Second World 
War, there was a major transformation of central 
banking in the developing world. As described by re-
nowned monetary historian of the New York Federal 
Reserve, Arthur I. Bloomfield reported in 1957:
During the past decade there has been a marked 
proliferation and development of central bank-
ing facilities in the underdeveloped countries 
of the world, along with an increasing resort 
to the use of monetary policy as an instrument 
of economic control. Since 1945, central banks 
have been newly established and pre-existing 
ones thoroughly reorganized, in no less than 
some twenty-five underdeveloped countries. 
In other cases the powers of pre-existing 
central banks have been broadened … nearly 
all underdeveloped countries today have cen-
tral banks, most of which are equipped with 
the full panoply of central banking powers 
... in large part the recent growth of central 
banking in the economically backward areas 
has also reflected a desire on the part of the 
governments concerned to be able to pursue 
a monetary policy designed to promote more 
rapid economic development and to mitigate 
undue swings in national money incomes 
(Bloomfield, 1957: 190). 
Bloomfield goes on to describe the functions, powers, 
and goals of these central banks.
Many of the central banks, especially those 
established since 1945 with the help of Federal 
Reserve advisers (emphasis added) are charac-
terized by unusually wide and flexible powers. 
A large number of instruments of general and 
selective credit control, some of a novel char-
acter, are provided for. Powers are given to the 
central bank to engage in a wide range of credit 
operations with commercial banks and in some 
cases with other financial institutions. … These 
and other powers were specifically provided 
in the hope of enabling the central banks … 
to pursue a more purposive (emphasis added) 
and effective monetary possible tan had been 
possible for most … that had been set up …
during the twenties and thirties … (that) for the 
most part (had) been equipped with exceeding 
orthodox statutes and limited powers which 
permitted little scope for a monetary policy 
designed to promote economic development 
and internal stability (emphasis added) and 
which were sometimes poorly adapted to the 
primitive financial structures of the countries 
concerned (ibid: 191).
Bloomfield describes the same tools of credit 
manipulation that were widely used in Europe, 
Japan and even the United States, following the 
Second World War: “...through selective credit 
controls applied to the banking system, through 
help in establishing and supporting special credit 
institutions catering to specialized credit needs, and 
through influence over the lending policies of such 
institutions, it can help to some degree to re-channel 
real resources in desired directions, both between 
the public and private sector and within the private 
sector itself” (ibid: 198). Of course, Bloomfield cau-
tions that; “Such measures would for the most part be 
justified, however, only to the extent that they do not 
conflict with the overriding requirement of financial 
stability or involve the central bank in details of a 
sort that might distract its attention and energies 
from the effective implementation of a policy aimed 
at stability” (ibid:197).
Writing about the same issue almost fifteen 
years later (in 1971), another prominent Federal 
Reserve official, Andrew F. Brimmer, a member of 
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, looked 
back on the experience with “developmental” central 
banking in the developing world. Brimmer and his 
associates describe a variety of techniques that central 
banks pursued in the 1960s: these included: providing 
capital to development institutions, such as industrial 
and agricultural development banks; extending credit 
to development banks an purchasing their securities; 
buying a small part of the equity of development 
banks; establishing a “securities regulation fund” to 
create a market for the securities of various develop-
ment finance institutions, by using the profits from the 
ordinary operations of the central bank (ibid: 785); 
using differential discount rates to allocate credit to 
capital development projects; the establishment of 
portfolio ceilings on activities having a low prior-
ity; various types of reserve requirements, including 
differential reserve requirements to influence the al-
location of credit; using import deposit requirements, 
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(primarily intended to deal with balance of payments 
difficulties) to also influence the allocation of bank 
credit (Brimmer, 1971). 
In contrast to Bloomfield, however, Brimmer 
on the whole was somewhat negative about the ef-
fectiveness of many of these techniques.
In light of the current wide-spread promotion 
of the “neo-liberal central banking” as the “best 
practice” in central banking, it is now time for a 
re-assessment of this historical experience. How-
ever, since Brimmer’s study of the experience with 
“developmental central banking” there has been no 
serious attempt to revisit these experiences to assess 
their impacts, to study what worked and what didn’t 
and to compare their results with that of the currently 
popular “neo-liberal” central banks.
My earlier study Central Banks as Agents of 
Devel op ment, commissioned by the World Institute for 
Development Economics Research (WIDER) (Epstein, 
2007) set out these general issues, but the case study 
material focused mainly on the currently developed 
economies. In this paper, I extensively extend the 
analysis of the earlier paper to focus experiences with 
developing country central banks. I also extend the 
analysis to suggest in a more detailed fashion some 
tools that developmental central banks, along with 
other institutions, can use to promote widely-shared 
growth.
In light of the financial crisis that began in 2007 
and is deepening and spreading as this paper is writ-
ten, I will also pay attention to the roles that central 
banks in developing countries can play in protecting 
their economies from the forces promoting financial 
instability.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in 
the next section, as a prelude to the historical discus-
sion of developmental central banks, I first discuss the 
neo-liberal approach to central banking. In section III, 
I describe some simple statistical attempts to assess 
on a comparative basis the impact of developmental 
central banking on economic growth. Section IV 
presents some case studies on developmental central 
banks in developing countries. Section V presents 
some concrete alternatives on how developmental 
central banks can implement a more socially use-
ful approach to central banking, including tools for 
protecting developing economies from financial 
instability. Section VI concludes. 
II. The neo-liberal approach to central 
banking
Central bank policy has become more impor-
tant and more difficult in many parts of the world. 
It has become more important because fiscal policy 
no longer plays much of a role in short-term and 
medium-run macroeconomic policy management. It 
has become more difficult because, not only is central 
bank policy the only remaining tool of stabilization 
policy, but also because the economic and financial 
environment in which central banks must operate 
has become more complicated. This complexity is 
due to several factors. Among the most important 
are the increased tendency toward domestic financial 
liberalization and increased international financial 
capital mobility. Both of these mean that the central 
bank must contend with increasingly rapid, potent 
and often fickle financial market expectations and 
reactions to monetary policy.
In this environment, it is not surprising that 
many central banks, and the governments and socie-
ties they are connected to, have been re-evaluating 
and searching for new modus operandi. The central 
questions motivating this search are: What are the 
best institutional structures, goals and operating 
procedures for central banks? Considering that cen-
tral bank policy has simultaneously became more 
important and more challenging one would think 
that central bank structures and operating proce-
dures would increasingly become objects of policy 
debate and political struggle. Moreover, one would 
think that given the importance, complexity and 
politicized nature of these issues, that economists 
and policy makers would develop a wide variety of 
answers, tailored to fit the broad array of political, 
institutional and economic circumstances in which 
different countries find themselves.
However, on the contrary, a powerful ideologi-
cal view – “neo-liberalism” – has led economists and 
policy makers increasingly to the view that funda-
mentally, there is one and only one central bank 
structure that is optimal for all circumstances: I will 
call this the “neo-liberal” central bank. The neo-liberal 
central bank has the following characteristics: (1) it 
should be highly independent of the democratic politi-
cal process to enhance its credibility and (2) its main 
goal should be maintaining a low level of inflation.
Proponents of the neo-liberal approach argue 
that central banks which adhere to these two planks 
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will deliver low inflation with no negative impacts 
on output, investment, unemployment or any other 
important macroeconomic variable. Indeed, by 
reducing and stabilizing inflation it will create a 
macroeconomic environment in which the economy 
will flourish and from which all can benefit. This view 
has crowded out virtually all serious debate about the 
fundamental questions such as what should be the 
proper goals of central bank policy.
In a fascinating survey, Alan Blinder, former 
vice-chair of the Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nors, makes clear just how strong is this consensus in 
favour of a “neo-liberal central bank” (Blinder, 1998). 
Blinder sent out a survey to the heads of 127 cen-
tral banks – the entire membership of the Bank for 
International Settlements, and to a “representative” 
sample of macro and monetary economists – that is, 
the members of two NBER programmes on macro 
and money. The response rate was extraordinarily 
high for the central bankers, 66 per cent, and respect-
able for the economists – 46 per cent. The survey 
asked questions concerning the nature and role of 
“credibility” and thereby indirectly on the importance 
of inflation, the costs of disinflation, and the nature, 
or lack there-of, in the trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment, among other things. 
“How important is the credibility of the central 
bank?” On a scale of 1 (unimportant) to 5 (of the 
utmost importance), the mean response among the 
84 central bankers was 4.83 with a standard devia-
tion of only 0.37. Economists’ mean response was 
4.23 with a standard deviation of 0.85; so they too 
see credibility as extremely important.
Why do they think credibility is important? The 
respondents ranked 7 possible reasons for the impor-
tance of credibility. The central bankers’ first choice 
was that it would lead to “less costly disinflation”, 
that is, a lower sacrifice-ratio. Their second choice 
was that it would help them “to keep inflation low”. 
The economists agreed that these are the top two 
reasons, though they reversed the order.
Amusingly, the central bankers’ last choice as 
to why credibility is important was “Public servants 
should be truthful”. Blinder speculated, “Perhaps, 
as one central banker wrote in his survey, central 
bankers do not like to think of themselves as ‘public 
servants’ ” (Blinder, 1998: 12–13).
“What makes a central bank credible?” Central 
bankers and economists agreed on the ranking of the 
seven choices offered. The top three were “history of 
honesty”, “central bank independence”, and “history 
of fighting inflation”. 
Blinder also presents interesting information on 
central bankers view of the Non-Accelerating Infla-
tion Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). Blinder notes 
based on his personal experience as a central banker, 
that “As far as I can tell, all central bankers accept the 
notion that there is no long-run (his emphasis) trade-
off between inflation and unemployment – despite 
the fact that the natural-rate Phillips curve fits the 
data poorly in most countries other than the United 
States” (Blinder, 1998: fn.16). 
Considering that there is apparently such a 
strong consensus among experts that these princi-
ples and their applications are the best approach 
to central bank policy, one would expect that there 
must be very strong theoretical and, probably more 
importantly, very strong empirical evidence in sup-
port of this view. However, the neo-liberal approach 
to central banking is riddled with myth. The myth 
result from the surprising lack of rigorous, general 
theoretical foundations and even more importantly, 
its lack of empirical support. For example, in the 
study described above, Blinder notes that, despite the 
consensus that more “credibility” reduces the cost of 
disinflation, “Unfortunately, the empirical evidence is 
squarely against the credibility hypothesis” (Blinder, 
1998: 9). How does one then explain the paradox of 
the enormous popularity of the neo-liberal approach 
to central banking along side such weak evidence 
in its support? The answer probably is that the neo-
liberal approach enhances the power, wealth and 
prerogatives of certain powerful groups in society 
at the expense of others in the guise of being in the 
general interest. 
The justification for the approach is based on 
two pillars: the theory of rational expectations and 
natural rate of unemployment or NAIRU. These 
lead to the idea of time inconsistency: the idea 
governments, to gain a political advantage, will try 
to pursue strategic expansionary monetary policy. 
Since economies are always at their NAIRU’s that 
implies that there is an inflationary bias to monetary 
policy. The second key idea is that societies can get 
a free lunch by enhancing the “credibility” of central 
banks, often by making them “independent” of the 
political process. Enhancing credibility, it is argued 
can reduce inflation with lower costs in increased 
unemployment or reduced economic growth. In other 
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words, central bank rules or central bank independ-
ence can reduce the “sacrifice ratio” associated with 
contractionary monetary policy geared to reducing 
inflation (Cukierman, 1992). 
There is virtually no support for any of these 
basic theoretical propositions: the relevance of ra-
tional expectations; the existence of a time invariant 
NAIRU; the importance of “time-inconsistency”; or 
the existence of credibility free lunches from inde-
pendent central banks or simple policy approaches 
such as inflation targeting. 
Inflation targeting (IT) is the latest and most 
popular version of this neo-liberal approach.1 Under 
inflation targeting, central banks use a small number 
of direct monetary tools to target a low inflation rate, 
usually in the mid single digits for developing coun-
tries, to the virtual exclusion of other targets. The 
so-called Taylor rule finds empirically that central 
banks target both inflation and unemployment (or 
economic growth), but this is what one would expect 
in an inflation targeting framework: unemployment 
or economic growth is a predictor of inflation so just 
because these variables have a significant coefficient 
in a reduced from regression equation does not mean 
they are valued as a goal in and of themselves. 
Much of the recent literature on the record of 
IT has focused mostly on whether systemic risks and 
accompanying volatility has been reduced in the IT 
economies, and whether inflation has come down ac-
tually in response to adoption of the framework itself 
or due to a set of “exogenously welcome” factors. On 
the one side, there is a fair amount of agreement that 
IT has been associated with reductions in inflation. 
Furthermore, exchange rate pass-through effects 
were reportedly reduced and consumer prices have 
become less prone to shocks (Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2001). Yet, existing evidence also suggests 
that IT has not yielded inflation below the levels 
attained by the industrial non-targeters that have 
adopted other monetary regimes (Ball and Sheridan, 
2003; Roger and Stone, 2005; Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2001). Moreover, even if domestic monetary 
policy has reduced inflation, the hoped for gains in 
economic growth and employment have, generally, 
not materialized. 
Moreover, little is known about the true costs 
of IT on potential output growth, employment, and 
on incidence of poverty and income distribution. 
Bernanke et al. (1999) report evidence that inflation 
targeting central banks do not reduce inflation at any 
lower cost than other countries’ central banks in terms 
of forgone output. That is, inflation targeting does 
not appear to increase the credibility of central bank 
policy and therefore, does not appear to reduce the 
sacrifice ratio. Per contra, based on an econometric 
study of a large sample of inflation targeters and 
non-targeters, Corbo et al. (2001) concluded that 
sacrifice ratios have declined in the emerging mar-
ket economies after adoption of IT. They also report 
that output volatility has fallen in both emerging and 
industrialized economies after adopting inflation tar-
geting. This position is recently complemented by a 
study of the IMF economists, who, using a complex 
econometric model and policy simulations, report 
findings that inflation targeting economies experi-
ence reductions in the volatility in inflation, without 
experiencing increased volatility in real variables 
such as real GDP (Batini et al., 2006). According 
to these estimates, inflation targeting central banks 
do enhance economic “stability” relative to other 
monetary rules, such as pegged exchange rates and 
monetary rules. 
However, in the assessments of “stability”, these 
papers do not consider the issue of the stability of as-
set prices, including exchange rates, stock prices and 
other financial asset prices. As the ongoing financial 
crisis shows, true macroeconomic stability requires 
the sustainability of asset prices and debt levels, 
something which a focus on commodity price infla-
tion will not insure, and indeed, might make worse. 
Asset price stability aside, while intriguing, these 
results are only as strong as the simulation model on 
which they are based and are only as relevant as the 
relevance of the questions they pose. Moreover, they 
are only as broad as the alternatives they explore. On 
all these scores, these results are problematic. First, 
they do not simulate the impact of inflation target-
ing relative to other possible policy regimes, such as 
targeting the real exchange rate as discussed below. 
Second, the model is based on estimates of potential 
output that are themselves affected by monetary 
policy. Hence, if monetary policy slows economic 
growth, it also lowers the rate of growth of potential 
output and, therefore reduces the gap between the 
two, thereby appearing to stabilize the economy.
Equally, if not more important, is the issue of 
setting the targeted rate of inflation itself. Even if 
the advocated requisites of the IT regime are taken 
for granted, it is not yet clear what the practically 
targeted rate of inflation should be. Even though there 
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appears to be a consensus among the advocates of 
the IT regime that the inflation target has to be “as 
low as possible”, there is no theoretical justification 
of this assertion; and as such, it sounds more of a 
recommendation than a careful calculation. 
Finally, is the issue of the role of IT in the 
context of supply shocks, which periodically affect 
individual economies and, indeed, is the dominant 
cause of inflation in most developing countries. Rigid 
inflation targeting rules can prove highly problematic 
in the context of supply-shocks, where the main prob-
lem facing countries is too little supply, not too much 
demand. To increase supply, a more developmental 
approach to central banking, as we describe below, 
can be helpful. 
A. Inflation targeting and IMF financial 
programming
The problems associated with inflation targeting 
are exacerbated when they are combined with the 
standard restrictions the IMF imposes on developing 
country borrowers’ monetary policy. These standard 
restrictions are called financial programming.
The IMF financial programming approach has 
been subject to a number of significant criticisms 
(Epstein and Heintz, 2006; Easterly, 2004). Easterly 
(2004) shows that there is significant empirical slip-
page in virtually every stage of the programming 
analysis, so that hitting ultimate targets becomes 
extremely problematic. As a result, the framework 
either routinely produces wrong results, or must be 
supplemented by other analyses that are not part of 
the programming framework. Partly as a result, the 
IMF has recently been imposing (or strongly rec-
ommending) additional targets, especially inflation 
targets (IT). Blejer et al. (2001) argue that inflation 
targets are redundant and sometimes inconsistent 
with the other IMF programming targets; Epstein 
and Heintz (2006) show that inflation targets enforce 
a contractionary bias on the regular programming 
targets, making it less likely that the central bank 
will accommodate economic growth and credit crea-
tion when desirable. Table 1 is reproduced from the 
Epstein and Heintz (2006) paper. In the traditional 
financial programming exercise, the main targets are 
net domestic assets ceilings (NDA, sometimes called 
“domestic credit ceilings”) which limit the amount 
of credit that the central bank can create, and the net 
international reserves floor (NIR), which require that 
monetary and fiscal policy are set to maintain a mini-
mum level of international reserves. If either target 
is threatened – that is, if international reserves are 
too low or if net domestic assets are too high – then 
the programme calls for tightening monetary policy, 
raising the target interest rate, cutting down on credit 
to the government and banking sector, and/or raising 
reserve requirements.
Table 1 
IMF FINANcIAl PROGRAMMING BASED ON NET DOMESTIc ASSETS cEIlINGS  
AND NET INTERNATIONAl RESERvES FlOORS
Net domestic assets (NDA)
Higher than programmed
(Threatened)
Lower than programmed
(Not threatened)
N
et
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
re
se
rv
es
 (N
IR
) Higher than programmed(Not threatened)
Only the NIR target has been met 
Policy: tighten
Both targets have been met
Policy: no need for tightening
Lower than programmed
(Threatened)
Neither target has been met 
Policy: tighten
NIR has not been met
Policy: tighten
Source: Epstein and Heintz (2006), adapted from Blejer et al. (2001: table 1).
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A key and troubling implication of this approach 
is that there is no clear set of conditions under which 
expansionary monetary or credit policies are called 
for, even in a situation of slow growth. Even if both 
targets are met, programming does not call for ex-
pansionary policy. This is largely because there is no 
explicit operational target for economic growth, em-
ployment creation, or poverty reduction. The bias of 
financial programming is therefore contractionary.
If explicit inflation targets are added to the 
traditional financial programming exercise, then 
this bias becomes even worse, especially in a situa-
tion of supply-side inflation shocks, as Madagascar 
and many other countries are experiencing now. 
Table 2 illustrates the problem. An inflation ceiling 
essentially adds an additional restriction on policy. 
Table 2 adapted from Blejer et al. (2001), illustrates 
this point. For example, in the situation where the 
NIR floor is met and NDA ceiling is met, but, say, 
because of a supply shock, the inflation target is not 
met, this approach would call for restrictive policy. 
Again, there is no situation which explicitly calls for 
looser policy because, as before, growth or employ-
ment generation does not have explicit targets within 
the monetary programming framework. 
None of this is meant to imply that we believe 
maintaining a moderate and stable inflation rate is 
unimportant; nor are we arguing that the macroeco-
nomic authorities in can ignore supply-side inflation. 
But it does suggest that unless economic growth 
targets are explicitly incorporated into the making of 
macroeconomic policy, there will be a bias against 
growth and employment in the formulation of policy 
as it is currently structured.
B. Alternatives to inflation targeting
Fortunately, there are alternatives to inflation 
targeting that hold out the promise of a more em-
ployment friendly monetary policy and that can be 
tailored to the particular circumstances and needs of 
different countries. A team of researchers working 
on a PERI/Bilkent project on alternatives to inflation 
targeting, as well as a United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) sponsored study of employ-
ment targeting economic policy for South Africa (see 
Epstein and Yeldan, 2008). The countries covered in 
this project are Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, India, the 
Philippines, South Africa, Turkey and Viet Nam. One 
Table 2 
FINANcIAl PROGRAMMING wITh NET DOMESTIc ASSETS,  
NET INTERNATIONAl RESERvES AND INFlATION TARGETS
Inflation target (IT)
Higher than programmed
(Threatened)
Lower than programmed
(Not threatened)
N
et
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om
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tic
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s (
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qu
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m
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ts
Higher than programmed
(Threatened)
NDA and IT give the same 
signal
NDA and IT give different 
signals (NDA – tighten; 
IT – don’t tighten)
Policy: tighten Policy: tighten
Lower than programmed
(Not threatened)
NDA and IT give different 
signals: IT – tighten; NDA – no 
tightening needed
NDA and IT give the same 
signal
Policy: tighten Policy: no tightening needed
Source: Epstein and Heintz (2006), adapted from Blejer et al. (2001: table 2).
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size does NOT fit all. A range of alternatives were 
developed in these papers, all the way from modest 
changes in the inflation targeting framework to allow 
for more focus on exchange rates and a change in the 
index of inflation used, to a much broader change in 
the overall mandate of the central bank to a focus on 
employment targeting, rather than inflation targeting 
(see table 3 for a summary). Some of the alternative 
policies focus exclusively on changes in central 
bank policy, while for other countries, changes in 
the broad policy framework and in the interactions 
of monetary, financial and fiscal policy are pro-
posed. Some incorporate explicit goals and targets, 
while others prefer more flexibility and somewhat 
less transparency. But all of the studies agreed that 
the responsibilities of central banks, particularly in 
developing countries, while including maintaining a 
moderate rate of inflation, must be broader than that, 
and should include other crucial “real” variables that 
have a direct impact on employment, poverty and 
economic growth, such as the real exchange rate, 
employment, or investment. They also agree that in 
many cases, central banks must broaden their avail-
able policy tools to allow them to reach multiple 
goals, including, if necessary, the implementation of 
capital management techniques.
All of these approaches, including employment 
targeting, are real targeting approaches to central 
banking.
This real targeting framework has a number of 
important advantages. 
 (i) First and foremost, it places front and centre the 
economic variables that have the most immedi-
ate and clearest association with social welfare. 
The central bank will be forced to identify this 
target and then reach it, and if it doesn’t do 
so, both explain why it failed and how it will 
improve in the next period. 
 (ii) Given the public pressure to reach this target, 
the central bank will have significant incen-
tives to invest in research and other activities, 
to improve its understanding and tools to reach 
this real target. 
 (iii) Given that it will need to reach this target amid 
other constraints, it will need to develop new 
tools of monetary policy. For example, if a central 
bank must hit an employment target subject to 
an inflation and balance of payments constraint, 
then – in addition to interest rate policy - it might 
explore asset allocation strategies to encourage 
banks to lend more to high employment gen-
erating uses, and capital control techniques to 
manage balance of payments problems.
 (iv) A real targeting approach lends itself naturally 
to a more democratic, transparent and account-
able central bank policy that serves the genuine 
needs of the majority of countries’ citizens, 
rather than the minority that typically benefits 
from the combination of slower growth, low 
inflation, and high real interest rates. 
 (v) The framework is much more conducive to 
tailoring monetary policy to the specific needs 
of different countries. For example, if a country 
has a particular problem with generating good 
jobs for women, or more jobs in a particular 
region of the country, then the real targeting 
approach can target women’s employment or 
more employment in a specific region (along 
with more employment generally) and devise 
instruments to achieve those objectives. 
In short, the real targeting approach to mon-
etary policy is likely to be more relevant, flexible and 
effective than inflation targeting. As a particularly 
relevant example of real targeting, below I describe 
in somewhat more detail employment targeting.
Implementing a real targeting approach is one 
pathway for a central bank to become an agent of 
development. This usually involves developing a 
broad set of tools, a range of targets, and cooperat-
ing closely with other institutions in government and 
the private sector to foster broad based economic 
development.
PERI / Bilkent alternatives to inflation targeting 
project
I now describe in more detail the alternatives 
to inflation targeting developed in the PERI/Bilkent 
project on alternatives to inflation targeting. Table 3 
summarizes these approaches.
In section V we describe in more detail what 
some of these tools and approaches are. But first we 
look at some statistical evidence (section III) and case 
study evidence (section IV) on the impact of a more 
active central bank on economic development.
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Table 3
PERI/BIlkENT AlTERNATIvES TO INFlATION TARGETING PROjEcT
Summary table
Country
Ultimate 
targets
Intermediate 
targets
Strict target or 
discretion
Additional tools/
instruments
Central Bank: 
independent, 
integrated or 
coordinated?
Argentina SCRER, 
inflation, 
activity level
Same as 
ultimate targets
Discretion Sterilization, reserve 
requirements 
(other prudential 
requirements), capital 
management techniques
Coordinated
Brazil Inflation, 
exports, 
investment
Inflation rate, 
SCRER, real 
interest rate
Asymmetric managed 
float (moving floor on 
exchange rate), bank 
reserves, bank capital 
requirements, bank 
capital requirements
NA
India GDP Growth, 
inflation, 
slightly 
undervalued 
exchange rate
Same as 
ultimate targets
Discretion Capital management 
techniques, if necessary
Integrated
Mexico Inflation, 
SCRER
Domestic 
inflation 
measure, 
SCRER, 
“sliding floor” 
on exchange 
rate
Discretion Capital management 
techniques
NA
South Africa Employment, 
inflation, 
exchange rate 
instability
GDP Growth, 
employment 
intensity of 
production
Strict employment 
target (coordinated 
with other 
institutions), 
looser inflation 
constraint
Credit allocation 
techniques (e.g. 
asset based reserve 
requirements,  loan 
guarantees, etc.), capital 
management techniques
Integrated
Turkey Inflation, 
SCRER
NA Discretion NA NA
Philippines Inflation, 
SCRER
Discretion Capital management 
techniques, prudential 
supervision of banks, 
targeted credit, incomes 
policies
Integrated
Viet Nam Growth, 
SCRER, 
inflation
Discretion Capital management 
techniques, prudential 
supervision of banks, 
targeted credit, incomes 
policies
Integrated
Source: See text.
Note: SCRER: Stable and Competitive Real Exchange Rate. NA: no answer, i.e., the issue was not directly addressed. Central 
Banks: integrated means integrated into governmental macroeconomic policy-making framework; coordinated means 
independent but committed to close coordination with other macroeconomic policy-making institutions.
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III. Some empirical evidence on the 
impact of developmental central 
banks on economic performance
Advocates of a developmental role for central 
banks argue that central banks that use a variety of 
tools such as credit allocation policies, regulated in-
terest rates, direct lending to priority sectors, and so 
on, can play a more effective role than can neo-liberal 
central banks. In the next section we discuss some 
case study evidence on this issue. Here we present 
some simple statistical evidence.
As an initial attempt to assess the impacts of 
more active central banks on economic outcomes, 
we assembled a data set based on statistics from 
the World Bank’s Financial Sector Database and 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS).2 The 
data include a sample of developing and developed 
countries and the data bracket the period 1950–2007, 
with most of the data available after the mid-1980s. 
These data – highly imperfect as they are – attempted 
to measure “developmental effort” of central banks 
by their balance sheet behaviour: in other words, we 
looked at the level of lending by the central banks 
to the private sector (primary, secondary and terti-
ary), as well as to quasi-public institutions, such as 
development banks. We then looked at the impact of 
this developmental effort on economic growth, both 
through panel level regressions and through more 
informal descriptive statistics.
Figures 1–4 below show scatter diagrams of 
the relationship between central bank credit opera-
tions in the economy, defined in four different ways, 
and 10 -year averages of real GDP growth for each 
economy (please see data annex for more information 
on data sources and definitions). Figure 1 measures 
central bank intervention effort by “central bank as-
sets/GDP”. Figure 2 measures activity by total central 
bank lending to the government/central bank assets 
relative to GDP. For figure 3, the measure is central 
bank claims on the private sector relative to central 
bank assets; and figure 4 is central bank claims on the 
financial sector, relative to total central bank assets. 
The data provided little support for either the 
opponents or critics of developmental operations of 
central banks. There seemed to be little overall cor-
relation between developmental effort and economic 
growth. The only relationship which is somewhat 
positively correlated is the relationship between 
central bank lending to the private sector and real 
Figure 1
cENTRAl BANk ASSETS / GDP AND  
GDP GROwTh
(Decade averages)
Figure 2
TOTAl cENTRAl BANk clAIMS ON 
GOvERNMENT INSTITUTIONS / TOTAl 
cENTRAl BANk ASSETS AND GDP GROwTh 
(Decade averages)
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economic growth (figure 3). But this relationship 
is weak.
To test this relationship more formally, we ran 
panel regressions, both fixed and random effects, 
lagging the variables one period to try to control for 
simultaneity bias. As the graphs indicate, there is an 
imprecisely estimated positive relationship between 
central bank lending to the private sector – an as-
pect of developmental banking – and real economic 
growth.3 Still, these results are rather weak. They 
lead us to suspect that country case studies might be 
a more valuable way of learning about the relation-
ship between developmental central banking and 
economic development.
Iv. Some developing country case studies
A. Central banks as agents of development 
in developing countries
The history of the evolution of central banks 
in developing countries will, in some ways, be quite 
familiar to students of central banking in the now 
developed world. Still, as Gerschenkron (1962) em-
phasized, the different world in which they came into 
being required some significant variations as well. 
Perhaps the most important differential contextual 
factors were the rise and fall of colonialism, and the 
rise and fall of Communism, both of which gave them 
a variety of inherited institutions and role models.
A full history of central banking in the develop-
ing world is obviously beyond the scope of this essay, 
but in this section, I want to briefly describe some of 
the aspects of this development in a subset of devel-
oping countries, most of whom belong to the “rest” 
as defined by Alice Amsden in her important study, 
The Rise of the Rest; Challenges to the West from 
Late Industrializing Countries (Amsden, 2001).4 The 
countries of the rest, according to Amsden, acquired a 
manufacturing base in the years prior to World War II 
and then, after the war, industrialized rapidly, moving, 
eventually into mid-level and even high-technology 
production. (ibid: 1–2). Among many other factors, 
Amsden stresses the important role of finance in 
the success of these countries, and especially the 
mobilization and allocation of medium term and 
long-term finance for industrialization. Along with 
the mobilization and allocation of finance, Amsden 
stresses the control and monitoring mechanisms that 
Figure 4
TOTAl cENTRAl BANk clAIMS ON ThE 
FINANcIAl SEcTOR / TOTAl cENTRAl BANk 
ASSETS AND GDP GROwTh 
(Decade averages)
Figure 3
TOTAl cENTRAl BANk clAIMS ON ThE 
PRIvATE SEcTOR / TOTAl cENTRAl BANk 
ASSETS AND GDP GROwTh
(Decade averages)
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sought to ensure that these investments were used 
productively to promote industrialization. In this 
regard, the key role of development banks as part of 
a “developmental state”. 
The developmental state was predicated on 
performing four functions: development bank-
ing; local-content management; “selective 
seclusion” (opening some markets to foreign 
transactions and keeping other closed); and na-
tional firm formation … Two principles guided 
developmentalism: to make manufacturing 
profitable enough to attract private enterprise 
through the allocation of intermediate assets 
(subsidies) and to induce such enterprises to 
be results-oriented and to redistribute their 
monopoly profits to the population at large. 
Step-by-step, governments groped toward a 
new control mechanism that replaced the in-
visible hand. The new mechanism ultimately 
shared credit with private initiative for a 
Golden Age of industrial expansion (Amsden, 
2001: 125).
In the post Second World War (“post-war”) 
period development banking filled the void left by 
absence of other financial institutions, investing first 
in key infrastructure that often generated demand for 
local labour and inputs which created business groups 
and local knowledge. Development banks themselves 
learned important skills such as project appraisal in 
the process (ibid.: 126). Foreign direct investment 
played a relatively minor role in this post-war push; 
instead the big player became the public sector. Public 
investment as a share of gross domestic investment 
in the period ranged from a high of 58 per cent in 
Mexico to a low of 25 per cent in Brazil (Amsden, 
2001: 127). For most countries of the rest, the share 
declined over the post-war period, but still the public 
sector was by far the single most important player in 
capital formation.
The state’s agent for financing investment was 
the development bank. The government’s role in 
long-run credit allocation was substantial even in 
part of the rest where development banks were of 
relatively minor importance (Malaysia, Thailand, 
Taiwan Province of China and Turkey). Sometimes, 
the whole banking sector in these countries was mobi-
lized to direct long-term credit to targeted industries, 
thereby “acting as a surrogate development bank” 
(Amsden, 2001: 129). 
Development banks raised capital at home or 
abroad and then used it either to buy equity in private 
or public firms or to lend to such firms at below 
market interest rates. Lending terms of development 
banks were almost always concessionary (Amsden, 
2001: 132). Effective real interest rates were often 
low, even negative. The public finance behind the 
rest’s development banking was often “off-budget” 
and related to non-tax revenues. It derived from for-
eign sources, deposits in government-owned banks 
post office savings accounts, and pension funds. In 
East Asia especially, these often occurred outside the 
general budget and parliamentary process, strength-
ening the hand of professional bureaucrats, as in 
post-war France and Japan. Governments in the rest 
also controlled non-tax related sources of funding 
such as foreign borrowing (through loan guarantees), 
ownership of financial institutions and the disposal 
of private savings (for example, through post-office 
savings banks) (Amsden, 2001: 133, 135). 
According to Amsden, the major weakness of 
development banks was not that they spent on the 
wrong industries, but that, in some cases, they spent 
too much overall.
1. The role of central banks
What was the role of central banks in this proc-
ess? As one might expect from the experiences in 
the now developed countries, the role varied from 
country to country. In India and China, for example, 
Central Banks played a crucial role as part of the 
planning apparatus and were key players in the al-
location of medium and long-term credit to industrial 
sectors. In Mexico and Thailand, the role was less 
important. In Brazil and the Republic of Korea, the 
role of Central Banks occupies a middle ground 
between these two groups’ roles. 
2. India and China 5
Mr. P.C. Bhattacharyya, a former Governor of 
the Reserve Bank of India (1962–1967), describes the 
role of central banking in India in the 1960s: 
India has consciously chosen a policy of 
planned economic development … The 
traditional objective of a central bank is the 
maintenance of price and exchange stability. 
However, this is but a means to achieve eco-
nomic progress rather than an end in itself. 
In the context of the developing countries, 
these objectives … have to be fitted into the 
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broader and more compelling urge for further-
ing economic growth … A country must have 
an appropriate degree of monetary expansion 
to met the increasing requirements of a grow-
ing economy … The aim of a central bank in 
a developing country has, therefore, to be the 
adoption of adequate policies which aim at 
bringing about an appropriate degree of mon-
etary expansion along with price and exchange 
stability … Further, monetary policy in such a 
country has also to provide for mobilization of 
resources to the maximum possible extent, as 
well as provide for the most efficient invest-
ment of the same for purposes of development 
(Bhattacharyya, 1971: 1–2).
This monetary manifesto provides a rather stark 
contrast with that of the neo-liberal central bank, but 
does not seem that far different from the post-war 
practices of Belgium, France, Italy and Japan as 
described above.
India at the time of independence faced serious 
gaps in institutional structures for the mobilization 
of savings and investment. The banking system 
was mostly urban and short-term oriented, provid-
ing mostly working capital of a short term nature 
(Bhattacharya, 1971: 3). The stock market was the 
mechanism for raising long-term capital, but, like 
most stock markets, these rationed out new firms. 
Thus, “it was only natural that the Reserve Bank of 
India…turned its attention at the very outset, to the 
development of various types of new institutional 
facilities to fill in the gaps. This became one of its 
main role in pursuance of the broader objective of 
the promotional aspect of central banking policy” 
(ibid.: 3). The Reserve Bank had to establish agricul-
tural co-operative banks, helping with raising funds 
and providing technical assistance; in the industrial 
field, the Reserve Bank helped to set up the Industrial 
Finance Corporation of India, which was intended 
to supply long-term capital needs of industry; the 
Reserve Bank also contributed substantially to the 
capital structures of various State Finance Corpora-
tions which were supposed to support the financial 
needs of the small industrial sector. In 1964, it also 
set up the Industrial Development Bank of India as 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Reserve Bank to 
“function at the apex of an integrated structure of 
industrial finance as well as to provide resources for 
large-sized projects of industrial development …” 
(ibid.: 5). The Reserve Bank also promoted branch 
banking to mobilize savings, and developed a system 
of industrial subsidies and preferences for targeted 
industries (ibid: 6–8).
Bhattacharyya emphasizes that monetary policy 
is only one part of economic policy and, as a result, 
the central bank cannot be an independent entity from 
the government, unto itself (Bhattacharya, 1971: 15), 
a statement from a central banker that would shock 
today’s promoters of the neo-liberal recipe. Bhat-
tacharyya further notes that direct instruments of 
monetary control have an important place in the tool 
kit of monetary policy: they can protect important 
sectors from credit tightening and allow for more 
direct monitoring of credit use (ibid.: 14), again a 
viewpoint similar to those employed by French and 
Japanese central bankers.
As in the case of post-war European countries, 
India deployed a broad set of capital and exchange 
controls, and, initially, controls over current account 
transactions as well (Epstein, et. al, 2005). These 
complemented the mobilization and credit alloca-
tion techniques employed by the Reserve Bank and 
associated institutions. Bhattacharyya further notes, 
that price and exchange rate stability cannot be ig-
nored, but are part of the fundamental development 
process (ibid.: 15). 
Since the 1970s, India has been engaged in a 
process of financial liberalization. There have been 
several reforms of the banking and financial sectors, 
liberalization of interest rates and exchange controls 
and an external financial liberalization as well. While 
elements of the old regime still exist, the context 
within which they operate has been radically altered. 
(Saez, 2004). The recent increase in economic growth 
in India has led some observers to hold liberalization 
and globalization to be responsible. Observers who 
agree with Amsden would suggest that it was dur-
ing the post-war years, where planning and credit 
mobilization and allocation, of which the Reserve 
Bank of India was a key part, that the foundation for 
recent growth was laid.
3. China
In China, until recently, the central bank has been 
entirely subsumed into the state planning apparatus. 
The banking industry has been entirely state owned 
since the revolution, and is highly concentrated. 
The Chinese economy has been characterized by 
exchange and capital controls, as well as strong con-
trols over interest rates and financial markets. (Saez, 
2004; Epstein et al., 2005a). Since the late 1970s, this 
system has undergone steady reforms along with the 
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increased role of markets, private investment and 
foreign investment in the Chinese economy.
From 1949 until the late 1970s, China was 
dominated by one bank: the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC). Its role was to help mobilize and allocate 
savings in accordance with the state plan. In the late 
1970s the government started to reform the banking 
system. By the early 1980s the PBOC was separated 
from the Ministry of Finance and its monopoly posi-
tion was ended. Eventually, four major commercial 
banks were created, all state owned. Competing with 
the four state banks is a second tier of state owned 
commercial banks. A third tier includes shareholding 
smaller regional banks, many of which were estab-
lished as part of the special economic zones that led 
economic reforms in the 1980s and early 1990s. In 
addition, since 1994, there have been three policy 
banks: the State Development Bank, the Export Im-
port Bank and the Agriculture Development Bank. 
These banks handled policy related lending to in 
association with government plans. In addition to 
these banks, China has a series of urban and rural 
cooperative banks (Saez, 2004: ch. 15). Finally, there 
are a series of non-bank financial institutions, includ-
ing insurance agencies, credit unions and savings and 
loans. The presence of private and foreign banking 
in China is still marginal. The Chinese accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) is expected to 
change this considerably (Saez, 2004: 31).
One of the important features of Chinese bank-
ing has been its close association with state owned 
enterprises (SOEs). This has now become a source 
of significant banking problems, with large numbers 
of non-performing loans connected with these SOEs. 
Among the major issues facing the financial sector is 
the management of these non-performing loans and 
the reform of the SOEs.
The interpretation of these loans and the role of 
SOEs in China’s development is highly contested. 
Some argue that these indicate large scale waste, 
inefficiency and corruption. Li argues, on the other 
hand, that these SOEs were much more efficient than 
is generally realized and have played a significant 
role in China’s industrial development and stabilizing 
aggregate demand. Given China’s phenomenal indus-
trial success and the large role of SOEs in the Chinese 
Economy, it would hard to make a case that they 
played no role in China’s stunning development.
The Chinese Central Bank was created out of the 
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) in 1983. The PBOC 
acted primarily as an agent of the Government’s plan 
and did not exert a significant independent effect on 
policy. As such, the Central Bank is best seen as a 
supporter of the overall plan and of credit allocation 
that accompanied China’s post-war growth, includ-
ing the strengths as well as the weaknesses of those 
developments.
Maintaining a low value of the exchange rate 
has been a crucial component of China’s development 
strategy and capital and exchange controls have been 
a crucial component of that strategy. More recently, 
as interest rates, financial markets and capital con-
trols have become more liberalized the People’s 
Bank of China has begun to take on more traditional 
macroeconomic roles typical of “modern” central 
banks. Still, it relies heavily on credit controls to 
conduct monetary policy, as it attempts to keep the 
Renminbi at an undervalued level for purposes of 
export promotion. The central bank’s management 
of these exchange controls has been amongst its 
most important developmental contribution in the 
last several decades.
4. Republic of Korea and Brazil 6
Sylvia Maxfield has stressed that in their found-
ing and early development, the Central Banks of 
the Republic of Korea and Brazil were profoundly 
influenced by strong governments and industrial 
sectors that had significant need for finance, and 
relatively weak and dependent domestic financial 
sectors, that were uninterested or unable to create a 
central banks that would operate primarily to support 
them (Maxfield, 1994). As a result, the Republic of 
Korea and Brazil both ended up with Central Banks 
that were tied to the requirements of government and 
the requirements of industry, and lacked the financial 
constituency to become highly independent of both. 
We will see that the role of these central banks as 
“agents of development” in the early post-war period 
stems from this set of relationships.
5. Republic of Korea
As we saw in our discussion of Amsden’s work, 
crucial to post-war success of the Republic of Korea 
as one of the “rest” was a strong planning and control 
mechanism combined with institutions to channel 
long-term resources to targeted infrastructure and 
productive industrial uses. As part of this mechanism, 
the government retained strong controls over the 
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financial system, particularly in the period 1961–
1979 (Nembhard, 1996: 90). As one economist put it, 
“Except for in times of war, only a few nations have 
used policies of selective credit control as widely 
and thoroughly as has Korea” (quoted in Nembhard, 
1996: 91). The government used the banking system 
to channel credit by setting low interest rates on loans 
to targeted borrowers, and directing loans to particu-
lar enterprises. Amsden emphasized that monitoring 
and performance requirements were associated with 
these loans. The government used “policy loans” to 
direct lending for preferred purposes. Lending rates 
and lending conditions were strictly controlled ac-
cording to the type of preferential fund. This allowed 
the government to effectively ration credit for certain 
purposes and ensure a plentiful supply for others.
What was the role of the Central Bank in the 
Republic of Korea’s development miracle? The 
Minister of Finance supervised and regulated all the 
activities of the banking system, including the Central 
Bank (the Bank of Korea). As in France and China, 
the Central Bank in the Republic of Korea was sub-
servient to these planning institutions and performed 
its assigned roles which evolved over time. Although 
the central bank was established with some degree 
of independence under the guidance of two experts 
from the New York Federal Reserve in the 1950s, the 
Bank was quickly put under the de facto control of 
the Ministry of Finance, until this subservience was 
formally enshrined in legislation in 1962 (Maxfield, 
1997: 113). At that time, the powers of the Bank were 
divided up among a number of entities, and the Bank 
of Korea itself was left only with credit policy. “This 
left a central bank that over the next several decades 
did little more than implement credit policies in line 
with policies designed by the Economic Planning 
Board and the Ministry of Finance. In fact, the bank 
was commonly called the “Namdaemun branch of 
the finance Ministry” referring to the Seoul district 
in which the bank is located” (Maxfield, 1997: 113). 
Over the two decades following, the central bank 
remained politically weak. The Bank oversaw the 
commercial banks’ implementation of credit distribu-
tion plans drawn up by the Economic Planning Board 
in accordance with overall industrialization goals. 
The government controls also limited the develop-
ment of the financial sector, so a strong financial 
constituency did not develop to oppose the credit 
market policies (Maxfield, 1997: 115). 
Complementing the controls over the financial 
sector has been an extensive set of exchange and 
capital controls (Nembard, 1996: 85–92.) These 
controls allowed the Government of the Republic of 
Korea to keep interest rates low when they wanted 
to and to allocate credit to desired purposes without 
much spillage overseas. They also helped to prevent 
financial instability at a macro level arising from 
unstable inflows and outflows of capital, and from 
excessive short-term borrowing.
As with other countries, in the 1990s, the 
Republic of Korea liberalized its financial system, 
eventually leading to the crisis of the late 1990s. 
Since that time, the Bank of Korea has been much 
more preoccupied with overall macroeconomic 
policy, and has had fewer tools and less of a mandate 
to act as an agent of development.
6. Brazil
Like many European Central Banks, the Bra-
zilian Central Bank started off as a private bank, the 
Banco do Brasil, which in the early 1900s financed 
coffee growers and industrialists. (Maxfield, 1997: 
123). Over the 1920s, Banco do Brasil became a 
quasi central bank, continuing its policies of sup-
porting these same sectors. British creditors preferred 
to have a “real” central bank that was not so tied 
to domestic borrowers, but the political power of 
the coffee growers and industrialists prevented the 
creation of a central bank to the creditors liking. A 
half-way institution, the Superintendence of Money 
and Credit (SUMOC) was created in 1945 to man-
age foreign exchange and credit, while the Banco 
do Brasil continued to actual make exchange rate 
and credit policy. It was also the recipient of legal 
mandatory reserves by commercial banks, but was 
exempted from having to keep them itself. Hence, 
it was privileged, as, we have seen, were previous 
central banks in their early years, despite being profit 
oriented. The political battles over the creation of a 
full, public central bank continued and a central bank 
was not formally created until the military coup of 
1964. But as soon as it was created, its independent 
authority was undermined and the central bank of 
Brazil was brought under the close authority of the 
central government (Maxfield, 1997: 136).
In this context, the Brazilian Central Bank has 
been tasked with implementing central government 
policy. This policy itself has varied over time. When 
the government was focused on reducing inflation 
(1965–1967) the government pursued more liberal 
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and outward oriented policies. When the government 
wanted to encourage rapid industrialization (1950s, 
1967–1974, 1985–1987) more inward oriented policies 
were pursued and the central contributed in classic 
fashion, helping to direct finances and favoured 
treatment to local industries, while implementing 
strict controls on inflows and outflows of capital 
(Nembhard: 145). 
Yet, the implementation of these policies were 
not nearly as effective as in the case of the Republic 
of Korea. There were many factors at play. Among 
the most relevant for our purposes was the highly 
decentralized nature of the country’s financial sys-
tem, which made it difficult for the central bank and 
related institutions to monitor and control the alloca-
tion of credit. Thus, while the Central Bank, under 
the direction of the government, tried to act as an 
agent of development, the relative lack of a coherent 
planning process and the difficulties dealing with a 
more dispersed financial system, meant that it was 
not as successful as industrial policy in the Republic 
of Korea (Nembard, 1996: ch. 5).
7. Thailand and Mexico
The cases of Thailand and Mexico present an 
interesting contrast with China and India and the 
Republic of Korea and Brazil (Maxfield, 1994 and 
1997). In these cases, relatively strong and independ-
ent private financial systems, along with a stronger 
need to borrow from foreign creditors, led both do-
mestic and foreign creditors to support the creation 
of relatively independent central banks (Maxfield, 
1994). In Thailand and Mexico, the Central Banks 
were much less closely tied to financing industry 
and the governments than in the cases of China and 
India, or Brazil and the Republic of Korea. And while 
their positions changed over time depending on both 
domestic and political factors, over all, these central 
banks played a larger role in attracting credit from 
abroad and supporting the domestic financial sectors, 
than they did in promoting industrialization. In the 
1990s for example, in the case of Thailand, the Cen-
tral Bank and the Government supported efforts to 
make Bangkok into a regional financial centre as part 
of development plan, reminiscent of the roles of the 
Federal Reserve and Bank of England. With the crash 
of 1997, the result was not a happy one, however.
Arguably, then, these Central Banks were more 
oriented to finance and to international creditors than 
to domestic industrial development, and, therefore, 
these central banks did not act as much as agents 
of development as had been the case in the other 
countries.
8. Conclusion
The mobilization, allocation and monitoring 
of medium- and long-term credit was crucial in the 
success of the “rest” in the post-war period. How-
ever, the role of central banking in supporting these 
policies varied from country to country, as a function 
of an array of complex factors, including inherited 
financial and industrial structures, the need for in-
ternational finance, and various idiosyncratic factors 
that affected the politics of central banking. In some 
countries, such as China, India and the Republic of 
Korea, conditions were ripe for Central Banks to play 
a key role as agents of development. In others, such 
as Brazil, the Central Bank played its role, but the 
overall structure was highly imperfect. In others, such 
as Thailand and Mexico, the Central Bank was not as 
firmly a part of the planning apparatus, and tended 
to be more oriented to the needs of the domestic and 
international financial interests than to that of the 
government or industry.
In all cases, where central banks played a crucial 
role, their connection with the state, with credit allo-
cation and their use of capital and exchange controls 
to manage the international sector were absolutely 
critical to their success. This is hardly following the 
recipe of a neo-liberal central bank.
v. Developmental tools for central bankers
The developmental approach to central bank 
discussed in previous sections, requires quite specific 
policy tools to be implemented. 
A. Some financial solutions
The previous case studies discussed industrial-
ized countries. Still there are a vast number of very 
poor countries that may be able to benefit from a 
more developmentally oriented role for central banks. 
In many of these countries, there is a dual financial 
sector: a “modern” sector that significant access to 
funds, but holds huge amounts of excess reserves 
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and charges very high lending rates relative to de-
posit rates, and funds mostly the government a very 
large business. Meanwhile, small and medium size 
enterprises are starved for credit. Micro-finance is 
often seen as a solution to this problem, but these are 
usually too small to make a large difference.
Another approach is to combine the resources 
available to formal sector financial enterprises and 
government financial institutions such as the central 
bank with the access, innovation, and lending ex-
periences of microcredit institutions (Atieno, 2001; 
Aryeetey, 2003; Pollin, Githinji and Heintz, 2008). 
There are several ways to do this that have been sug-
gested in the literature, and also put into practice. For 
most of these to work, the central bank must play a 
key role.
Among the most promising are those that 
involve programmes in which formal sector institu-
tions such as commercial banks or central banks 
take positions in cooperative, microcredit and other 
development-oriented financial institutions, either by 
lending to them and or by taking equity positions in 
them. To be successful, these programmes usually 
involve government regulations and subsidies that 
generate carrots and sticks for formal sector institu-
tions to extend credit to these smaller institutions 
that then on-lend to poor and/or small borrowers 
with good potential.
Another way to raise lending and investment to 
scale so that it can have a transformative impact is 
to create development banking institutions that take 
direct positions in final borrowers who are engaged 
in activities that will generate large numbers of good 
jobs and high value- added, and contribute to the 
structural transformation of the economy. The Gov-
ernment of Madagascar is considering this approach, 
as we discuss in more detail below.
Mobilizing financial resources and allocating 
them to productive units in key sectors could be a 
crucial component of the development strategy for 
developing countries. 
Building on work I and my colleagues at the 
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) have 
undertaken in Ghana, South Africa, Kenya and Mada-
gascar, we suggest financial policies and innovations 
that could be implemented, such as asset-backed 
reserve requirements, development banking, and loan 
guarantees, that can help generate more investment 
in key sectors to increase employment and incomes 
for the poor (Pollin, Epstein, Heintz and Ndikumana, 
2006; Epstein and Heintz, 2006; Pollin, Githinji and 
Heintz, 2008; Epstein and Grabel, 2007). The central 
bank can play a key role in managing and directing 
many of these programmes.
Here we outline several policies along these 
lines that can be used to help re-deploy and trans-
form the financial sector to facilitate achieve more 
good jobs, raise productivity, and reduce poverty. In 
particular we will focus on three: (1) asset-backed 
reserve requirement (ABRR); (2) loan guarantees; 
and (3) development banking.
B. Formal sector banks
Carrots and sticks need to be applied to formal 
sector banks to get them to lend more to high-priority 
sectors, or that can be identified by the type of input-
output analysis we described above. Here we present 
two examples of carrots and sticks that can be used 
to encourage formal sector banks to become so 
engaged. The first is asset- backed reserve require-
ments; the second, more extended example, is loan 
guarantees.
1. Example I: Asset-backed reserve requirements
As discussed in more detail in Pollin et al. (2006, 
2008), with a system of asset-backed reserve require-
ments, banks are required to hold reserves against 
their income-earning assets. However, they are al-
lowed to hold smaller required reserves on assets that 
are identified as contributing to employment genera-
tion and poverty reduction, perhaps using the type of 
analysis we describe below. This would encourage 
banks to lend directly to high-priority sectors. Simi-
larly, securities issued by smaller institutions that are 
experienced in making loans to small/poor borrowers 
or small and medium sized enterprises, microfinance 
institutions, and rural banking cooperatives can have 
preferred reserve requirements as well. 
2. Example II: Loan guarantees – loan guarantee 
scheme 7
A loan guarantee programme could help to mobi-
lize resources from commercial banks for on-lending 
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to microcredit and other institutions who have the 
knowledge and experience to on-lend to cooperatives, 
small entrepreneurs, and businesses for productive 
activity, or to make direct loans to the final borrowers, 
if the commercial banks so choose. The basic idea is 
that the government would guarantee a certain per-
centage of the loan, thereby reducing the default risk 
faced by the bank; this can help to substitute for col-
lateral which most borrowers in the target group will 
not be able to provide. This would also help keep the 
interest rate charged to the final borrowers lower.
The programme works as follows. The govern-
ment chooses to guarantee a certain portion of loans 
from commercial banks or other lenders to borrowers 
who will achieve programme goals, such as generate 
more decent jobs, increase productivity, and improve 
the quality of jobs, or invest in innovations or infra-
structure to reduce the cost of inputs or consumption 
goods consumed by the poor, and thereby have strong 
multiplier effects through the economy to raise the 
standard of living of the poor. The guarantees may 
also underwrite a programme by commercial banks 
to lend to microcredit institutions who will then lend 
to final borrowers.
In setting up such a programme, there are sev-
eral issues that must be addressed:
 (a) How to determine to whom to lend.
 (b) What should be the rate of loan guarantee?
 (c) How to monitor the programme to avoid corrup-
tion, excessive moral hazard, and inefficiency.
3. How to determine to whom to lend
Indirect lending to development institutions. 
The key here is to start with development finance 
institutions that have the knowledge, track record, 
and experience to identify final borrowers that can use 
the credit productively to create decent jobs, directly 
or indirectly, for themselves and, on a larger scale, 
for others in their community. The point will be to 
raise the scale and reach of these institutions. Careful 
attention will have to be paid to the organizational 
structure of the programme, and it may vary from 
region to region. But the key will be to pool the re-
sources to be able to benefit from economies of scale 
and knowledge, without so much centralization that 
the programmes bypass small borrowers that can both 
benefit directly and have the possibility to help create 
value for their locales and communities.
Direct lending by commercial banks. If the large 
banks want to start lending directly to such borrow-
ers, then, since they do not have a track record of 
doing so, it would work best if they were to develop 
a business plan and a “Decent Employment Impact 
Statement” that makes clear how many jobs, and 
at what wages and benefits, would be generated by 
their loans, and, if possible, some clear idea of the 
domestic linkages and multiplier effects. Such direct 
lending, especially to small and medium enterprises, 
would be highly desirable, but to receive the loan 
guarantees, they would have to demonstrate the likely 
employment effects.
4. What should be the rate of loan guarantee?
In choosing the rate of loan guarantee, there 
are a number of considerations that must be taken 
into account, including moral hazard, and the cost of 
the programme to the government. The problem of 
moral hazard dictates that the government guarantee 
must be less than 100 per cent of the loan, and pos-
sibly significantly less. To reduce moral hazard (and 
the cost to the government), other mechanisms that 
substitute for collateral should also be developed, as 
we describe below. As we see momentarily, the cost 
to the government will also depend on the rate of 
guarantee. The higher the rate of guarantee, all else 
constant, the higher the cost to the government and 
the greater the problem of moral hazard. However, 
the lower the rate of government guarantee, the less 
attractive will be the programme to lenders and to 
borrowers.
5. Monitoring and anti-corruption protection
As discussed in detail in Pollin, Githinji and 
Heintz (2008), a potential problem with any pro-
gramme is corruption. In business as well as govern-
ment, monitoring and accountability issues will be 
crucial. In the case of the loan guarantee programme, 
it is quite easy to see the form that corruption could 
take, especially in cases where the government guar-
antees a large percentage of the loan: the lender and 
borrower could arrange a false loan; the borrower 
could default, receive the payment from the govern-
ment, and split the proceeds. 
Of course, close monitoring and accounting 
could, in principle, prevent such corruption from 
occurring. But monitoring itself has costs and there 
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are advantages to add complimentary measures to 
monitoring schemes to reduce the incentives for 
corruption. Pollin et al. (2006, 2008) have designed 
an anti-corruption system based on escrow accounts 
and “whistleblower” awards that can help cut down 
on the likelihood of significant corruption. We will 
briefly outline these arrangements here.
6. Incentive-based monitoring
Escrow accounts. To reduce the incentive for 
corruption, the government could implement a sys-
tem of escrow accounts. The account would work as 
follows: The lender places a certain percentage of 
the loan in an escrow account with the government 
or central bank. If there is a default, the lender will 
receive the amount placed in escrow only after a 
thorough investigation of the case to establish there 
was no corruption involved. If there is no default, then 
the borrower receives the amount at the end of the 
period, which can then be rolled over as part of the 
new loan with minimal administrative interventions 
(forms, filings, etc.) or can be repaid to the lender. 
Such escrow accounts will clearly cut down on incen-
tives for corruption, but at some cost in terms of the 
available funds available to the borrower.
Whistleblower incentives. This is another incen-
tive-based monitoring measure suggested by Pollin 
et al. (2008), based on an idea promoted by Dean 
Baker. His idea is to create large penalties for fraud, 
combined with high rewards for “whistleblowers” 
(combined with strong penalties for fraud on their 
part). For example, defrauding the loan guarantee 
system would involve large civil and possibly even 
criminal penalties. Bank employees or others with 
key information who provide key information that 
could be used to prove or to lead to investigations 
that would prove the fraud would receive a sizeable 
financial reward. 
Corruption and inefficiency can plague all eco-
nomic endeavours, be they private or public. Having 
sensible, serious policies in place to reduce the incen-
tives for corruption and to identify and penalize it can 
make a key difference between a successful and an 
unsuccessful programmes.
One objection to these types of mechanisms is 
that they might seem to be similar to the “directed 
lending programmes” that have failed in earlier pe-
riods. However, the programmes here are designed 
to incorporate strong monitoring and anti-corruption 
mechanisms and are also part of development pro-
grammes that are embedded in strong market-based 
initiatives.
(a) Exchange rates and capital management in an 
era of financial instability
International financial markets have once again 
become treacherous for developing countries. Even 
in the best of circumstances, developing countries, 
by virtue of their size and location in the global 
economy, cannot help but be buffeted by major 
swings in the markets. Still, developing countries 
can undertake policies to protect themselves to some 
extent from the exigencies of global prices, com-
modity and financial flows. And in calmer times, 
these countries still need tools to best manage their 
macroeconomic needs within a global context, es-
pecially if they want to achieve better outcomes for 
decent employment, poverty reduction and financial 
stability. In this section we focus on themes that have 
mostly emerged from our earlier discussion: as we 
have seen an employment oriented monetary and 
financial policy framework needs to be able to have 
a stable and competitive real exchange rate, the abil-
ity to mobilize and allocate credit to desired sectors, 
reasonable real interest rates and inflation rates, and 
financial stability.
Managing the real exchange rate and interna-
tional debt and capital flows hence become crucial 
to achieving these outcomes. These are difficult to 
do even under the best of circumstances, and as we 
have discussed above, these become extremely dif-
ficult to achieve in a context of wide-spread financial 
liberalization, as unstable and pro-cyclical inflows of 
capital can lead to inappropriate real exchange rates, 
but also, when the capital suddenly stops and the 
leaves (“sudden-stops”) it can leave a trail of debts 
and problems that are difficult to cope with.
Hence, capital management techniques, widely 
used by successful countries such as China, India, 
the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, 
Singapore and others, need to be employed to deal 
with these swings in capital and debt flows, as well 
as for managing the real exchange rate.
In this section we discuss how capital man-
agement techniques have been used by a variety of 
countries to supplement the macroeconomic policy 
tool-box, in light of our earlier discussion of targets 
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and instruments available to central banks and finan-
cial authorities in general. As we discussed earlier, 
central banks need more tools if they are to achieve 
a larger number of objectives. Capital management 
techniques are among the most important tools they 
can use to help them deal with the exigencies of the 
international financial markets.
(b) Capital management techniques 8
Capital management techniques, to refer to 
two complementary (and often overlapping) types 
of financial policies: policies that govern interna-
tional private capital flows and those that enforce 
prudential management of domestic financial institu-
tions. Regimes of capital management take diverse 
forms and are multi-faceted. Capital management 
techniques can be static or dynamic. Static manage-
ment techniques are those that authorities do not 
modify in response to changes in circumstances. 
Capital management techniques can also be dynamic, 
meaning that they can be activated or adjusted as 
circumstances warrant. Three types of circumstances 
trigger implementation of management techniques 
or lead authorities to strengthen or adjust existing 
regulations--changes in the economic environment, 
the identification of vulnerabilities, and the attempt 
to close loopholes in existing measures.
Some types of capital management techniques 
have a proven track record, not just in the decades that 
followed the Second World War, but in the current 
environment as well. This latter fact is increasingly 
recognized today, even by many prominent econo-
mists and the IMF who have recently written rather 
positively – though nevertheless cautiously – about 
the role of certain types of market-based, temporary 
capital management techniques. The problems as-
sociated with unfettered international private capital 
flows have become quite obvious, particularly in light 
of the current financial crises Capital management 
techniques played critically important roles during 
the high-growth eras of Japan and the Republic of 
Korea and were successfully employed in Brazil in 
the 1950s and 60s. (e.g., Nembhard, 1996). Chile 
and Colombia successfully used capital manage-
ment techniques during the 1990s. The Malaysian 
Government successfully employed stringent capital 
management policies in 1994 and 1998. India, Singa-
pore, China and Taiwan Province of China employed 
diverse strategies that could be termed (even if not 
by the government itself) capital management tech-
niques during the 1990s. 
Epstein, Grabel and Jomo (2005) presented 
seven case studies of the divers capital management 
techniques employed in Chile, Colombia, Taiwan 
Province of China, India, China, Singapore and 
Malaysia during the 1990s. The cases reveal that 
policymakers were able to use capital management 
techniques to achieve critical macroeconomic objec-
tives. These included the prevention of maturity and 
locational mismatch;9 attraction of favoured forms 
of foreign investment; reduction in overall financial 
fragility, currency risk, and speculative pressures in 
the economy; insulation from the contagion effects of 
financial crises; and enhancement of the autonomy of 
economic and social policy. The paper examines the 
structural factors that contributed to these achieve-
ments, and also weighs the costs associated with these 
measures against their macroeconomic benefits (see 
Grabel, 2003).
The general policy lessons of these seven ex-
periences are as follows. (1) Capital management 
techniques can enhance overall financial and cur-
rency stability, buttress the autonomy of macro and 
micro-economic policy, and bias investment toward 
the long-term. (2) The efficacy of capital manage-
ment techniques is highest in the presence of strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals, though management 
techniques can also improve fundamentals. (3) The 
nimble, dynamic application of capital management 
techniques is an important component of policy suc-
cess. (4) Controls over international capital flows 
and prudential domestic financial regulation often 
function as complementary policy tools, and these 
tools can be useful to policymakers over the long 
run. (5) State and administrative capacity play 
important roles in the success of capital manage-
ment techniques. (6) Evidence suggests that the 
macroeconomic benefits of capital management 
techniques probably outweigh their microeconomic 
costs. (7) Capital management techniques work best 
when they are coherent and consistent with a national 
development vision. (8) There is no single type of 
capital management technique that works best for all 
developing countries. Indeed our cases, demonstrate 
a rather large array of effective techniques. 
(c) Managing real exchange rates
Exchange market intervention, supported by 
capital management techniques can be helpful, and 
indeed might be essential to help maintain a stable 
and competitive real exchange rate as I discussed ear-
lier. China, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province 
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of China, India and many other countries have used 
capital management techniques for this reason as an 
additional tool to support employment and growth 
policies undertaken by governments, including the 
central bank.
For example, Galindo and Ros (2008), as part 
of Epstein and Yeldan’s project on alternatives to 
inflation targeting, proposed utilizing such a policy. 
In the case of Mexico, Galindo and Ros find that 
monetary policy was asymmetric with respect to ex-
change rate movements –tightening when exchange 
rates depreciated, but not loosening when exchange 
rates appreciated. This lent a bias in favour of an 
over-valued exchange rate in Mexico. So they pro-
pose a “neutral” monetary policy so that the central 
bank of Mexico responds symmetrically to exchange 
rate movements and thereby avoid the bias toward 
over-valuation without fundamentally changing the 
inflation targeting framework. In their own words, 
“the central bank would promote a competitive 
exchange rate by establishing a sliding floor to the 
exchange rate in order to prevent excessive appre-
ciation (an ‘asymmetric band’…). This would imply 
intervening in the foreign exchange market at times 
when the exchange rate hits the floor (i.e., an appre-
ciated exchange rate) but allows the exchange rate 
to float freely otherwise”. They point out that such a 
floor would work against excessive capital inflows 
by speculators because they would know the central 
bank will intervene to stop excessive appreciation. 
If need be, Galindo and Ros also propose temporary 
capital controls, as do some of the other authors from 
the PERI/Bilkent project as a way of helping to main-
tain a stable and competitive real exchange rate.
(d) Policies toward foreign borrowing to help 
maintain financial stability 10
As I mentioned above, in the current crisis, ex-
cessive foreign borrowing has made some countries 
especially vulnerable to “sudden stops” in the flows 
of financial resources.
One way of dealing with such problems is for 
developing countries to consider drastically reducing 
their reliance on foreign bank loans. For example, 
policymakers could enforce strict ceilings on the 
volume of new foreign loans that can be incurred. 
Such ceilings might involve strict limits on the 
allowable ratio of foreign to total loans, or might 
require that firms finance only a certain percentage 
of their projects with foreign loans that have a certain 
maturity and/or locational profile.
Restrictions on foreign borrowing could be 
deployed dynamically as circumstances warrant, fol-
lowing the trip wire-speed bump approach. Under this 
approach, policymakers would monitor a trip wire that 
measures the economy’s vulnerability to the cessation 
of foreign lending. This involves calculating the ratio 
of the government’s holdings of currency reserves 
to private and public foreign-currency denominated 
debt (with short-term obligations receiving a greater 
weight in the calculation). If this ratio approached 
an announced threshold, policymakers would then 
activate a graduated speed bump that precluded new 
inflows of foreign loans until circumstances improved 
(Grabel, 2004). 
Policy can also discourage – rather than prohibit 
– the use of foreign loans as a source of finance. The 
tax system can be used in a number of ways to dis-
courage domestic borrowers from incurring foreign 
debt obligations. Domestic borrowers might pay a 
fee to the government or the central bank equal to a 
certain percentage of any foreign loan undertaken. 
This surcharge might vary based on the structure of 
the loan, such that loans that involve a locational or 
maturity mismatch incur a higher surcharge. Alter-
natively, the surcharge might vary based on the level 
of indebtedness of the particular borrower involved, 
such that borrowers who already hold large foreign 
debt obligations face higher surcharges than do less-
indebted borrowers. This tax-based approach could 
encourage borrowers to use domestic sources of 
finance since these would not carry any surcharge. 
Another strategy might involve varying the surcharge 
according to the type of activity that was being 
financed by foreign loans. For instance, borrowers 
might be eligible for a partial rebate on foreign loan 
surcharges when loans are used to finance types of 
production that are highly employment intensive. 
To the extent that borrowers assume at least 
some foreign loan obligations, it is imperative that 
the allocation and terms of these loans be managed 
by the government. Careful management of the al-
location of foreign debt can ensure that it is used 
for productive, developmental purposes. Prior to 
financial liberalization in the 1990s, many govern-
ments in East and Southeast Asia tightly coordinated 
allocation and access to foreign loans. Until quite 
recently, policymakers in China and India maintained 
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tight restrictions on foreign borrowing through a 
variety of means. 
In general, authorities should avoid widespread 
maturity and locational mismatches. A Maturity 
mismatch occurs when borrowers finance long-term 
obligations with short-term credit, leaving them vul-
nerable to changes in the supply and cost of credit. A 
locational mismatch occurs when borrowers contract 
debts that are repayable in foreign currency, leav-
ing them vulnerable to currency depreciation that 
increases the cost of debt service. 
In addition to the ceilings, surcharges or ap-
proval processes discussed above, policymakers can 
design trip wires and speed bumps that are designed 
to keep the levels of maturity and/or locational mis-
match below the critical thresholds. A trip wire for 
locational mismatch is the ratio of foreign-currency 
denominated debt to domestic-currency denominated 
debt (with short-term obligations receiving a greater 
weight in the calculation). A trip wire for maturity 
mismatch is the ratio of short-term debt to long-term 
debt (with foreign-currency-denominated obligations 
receiving a greater weight in the calculation). A grad-
uated series of speed bumps that require borrowers to 
reduce their extent of locational or maturity mismatch 
would be implemented whenever trip wires revealed 
the early emergence of these vulnerabilities. 
In those cases where foreign loans have been 
significant, economic reforms that promote growth 
could replace the resources initially lost if there is a 
reduction in foreign borrowing due to the measures 
described above. Governments and central banks 
that take steps to restrict foreign borrowing can re-
place at least some of the finance that is forgone by 
implementing measures that increase their ability to 
mobilize and channel domestic saving to projects 
that are central to a pro-poor growth agenda as we 
have discussed above. In this connection, measures 
that restrict the exit options of domestic savers and 
businesses would increase the pool of capital avail-
able domestically. 
There is a strong case for restricting the access 
of domestic savers to foreign capital markets. The 
flight of domestic investors can induce financial 
instability, and reduce the tax base and the pool of 
domestic savings available for allocation by domes-
tic financial institutions. For these reasons, there is 
a strong case for restricting the ability of domestic 
investors to hold foreign savings accounts and engage 
in capital flight. 
There is plenty of evidence that when properly 
implement, management of inflows and outflows 
of portfolio investment can enhance the ability to 
undertake macroeconomic policy and help achieve 
developmental goals. The success of blunt restric-
tions on portfolio investment in China, India, Chile 
and Colombia suggest that foreign investors do 
not necessarily shun countries with minimum-stay 
requirements on foreign investment or other types 
of capital management techniques. We have also 
seen that the tax system can be used to influence the 
composition and/or maturity structure of international 
capital flows. The potential for flight by domestic in-
vestors and savers can be reduced via implementation 
of exit taxes, prohibitions on flight, or restrictions on 
access to foreign currencies. Finally, Malaysian expe-
rience suggests that speed-bump style management 
of portfolio investment can be effective as well. 
vI. conclusion
The current economic crisis, more than previous 
ones this past decade, has called into question the 
whole neo-liberal approach to financial management, 
including the approach the neo-liberal approach to 
central banking. Central banks focused on commod-
ity inflation miss asset bubbles and credit crises, and 
with liberalized financial markets, they often lack 
the necessary tools to deal with these crises. Thus, 
academics and policy makers must seriously search 
for alternatives to the current neo-liberal models 
of financial management. This paper has argued 
that one place to look for models is the history of 
developmental central banks and financial policies. 
Of course, there is not simple return to the past. But 
there are plenty of models and institutional structures 
to learn from. The cross-sectional data do not indi-
cate broad conclusions of success or failure. Much 
is to be learned from country case studies and the 
implementation of developmental tools in concrete 
circumstances.
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Notes
 1 This section draws heavily on Epstein and Yeldan (2008).
 2 Please see data annex for more information on data sources 
and definitions.
 3 Full statistical results are available from the author upon 
request.
 4 Amsden’s “rest” consist of China, India, Indonesia, Malay-
sia, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China and 
Thailand in Asia; Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico in 
Latin America; and Turkey in the Middle East. (Amsden, 
2001: 1). Here I only have space to discuss six of these 
countries.
 5 Saez (2004) is an important source for the material in this 
section.
 6 This section draws heavily on Nembhard (1996) and 
Maxfield (1994, 1997).
 7 This section draws extensively on Pollin et al. (2008), 
especially chapter 9. Also see Atieno (2001), who discusses 
such a programme for Kenya.
 8 This section draws extensively on Epstein, Grabel and Jomo 
(2005); Epstein and Grabel (2007); and Grabel (2005).
 9 Maturity mismatch occurs when borrowers finance long-
term obligations with short-term credit, leaving them 
vulnerable to changes in the supply and cost of credit. 
Locational mismatch occurs when borrowers contract 
debts that are repayable in foreign currency, leaving them 
vulnerable to currency depreciation that increases the cost 
of debt service. 
 10 This section draws heavily on Epstein and Grabel (2007); 
and Grabel (2003).
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The time-series dataset used in figures 1–4 in-
cludes annual data for the 1960–2006 period and was 
compiled for fifty-two countries (Australia, Bahamas, 
Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, 
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, 
Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Por-
tugal, Republic of Korea, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, 
Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United States, Venezuela (Bolivar-
ian Republic of), Zimbabwe). This set of countries 
was primarily chosen due to its representative nature 
(both in geographic and socioeconomic terms), but 
also due to the consistent availability of data from 
the sources cited.
The scatter plots of figures 1–4 are based on 
“decade” moving averages for the period in consid-
eration (i.e. 1960–1969, 1970–1979, 1980–1989, 
1990–1999, 2000–2006). While the last period in-
cludes only seven years, we have decided to include 
it for the sake of comparison. Thus, each observation 
represents a decade average for a single country. In 
cases where data for one of the variables is miss-
ing for all the years in the decade, the respective 
observation is dropped altogether from the analysis. 
As a result, the coverage in terms of the number of 
observation varies among the figures (i.e. figures 1, 
2, 3 and 4 include 218, 233, 132 and 220 observa-
tions, in that order). Partial averages were used for 
observations having at least two (but less than 10) 
years of data. A detailed description of the variables 
under consideration is included below.
variables
CBAGDP: Central Bank Assets / GDP
Source: Beck et al. (2000). 
Description: Claims on domestic real nonfinan-
cial sector by the Central Bank as a share of GDP, 
calculated using the following deflation method: 
{(0.5)*[Ft/P_et + Ft-1/P_et-1]}/[GDPt/P_at] where F is 
Central Bank claims, P_e is end-of period CPI, and 
P_a is average annual CPI.
GDPGR: GDP Growth
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Description: Gross Domestic Product annual rate 
of change.
TCGOVTA: Total Central Bank Claims on 
Government Institutions / Total Central Bank 
Assets
Source: Aggregates based on data from the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Database.
Description: Total claims by monetary authorities 
(i.e. central banks and other institutions that un-
dertake monetary functions like issuing currency, 
holding foreign reserves, etc.) on domestic govern-
ment institutions as a percentage of all monetary 
authorities’ assets. Figures for the total claims on 
government institutions is obtained by aggregating 
Claims on Central Government (line 12a), Claims on 
State and Local Governments (line 12b), and Claims 
on Nonfinancial Public Enterprises (line 12c). Total 
Monetary Authorities’ Assets comprise all domestic 
claims plus foreign assets held by these authorities. 
The IMF defines Nonfinancial Public Enterprises 
as “government-owned and/or -controlled units 
which either sell industrial or commercial goods & 
services to the public on a large scale, and/or they 
are corporate”.
TCPSTA: Total Central Bank Claims on the 
Private Sector / Total Central Bank Assets
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics 
database.
Description: Total claims by monetary authorities 
(i.e. central banks and other institutions that un-
dertake monetary functions like issuing currency, 
holding foreign reserves, etc.) on the private sector 
(households and firms) as a percentage of all mon-
etary authorities’ assets. Figures for the total claims 
on the private sector are obtained from line 12d of 
IFS. Total Monetary Authorities’ Assets comprise 
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all domestic claims plus foreign assets held by these 
authorities.
TCFSTA: Total Central Bank Claims on the 
Financial Sector / Total Central Bank Assets
Source: Aggregates based on data from the IMF, 
International Financial Statistics Database.
Description: Total claims by monetary authorities 
(i.e. central banks and other institutions that un-
dertake monetary functions like issuing currency, 
holding foreign reserves, etc.) on financial institutions 
as a percentage of all monetary authorities’ assets. 
Figures for the total claims on financial institutions 
is obtained by aggregating Claims on Deposit Money 
Banks (line 12e), Claims on Other Banking Institu-
tions (line 12f), and Claims on Nonbank Financial 
Institutions (line 12g). Total Monetary Authorities’ 
Assets comprise all domestic claims plus foreign as-
sets held by these authorities. The IMF defines Other 
Banking Institutions as “institutions that do not ac-
cept transferable deposits but that perform financial 
intermediation by accepting other types of deposits 
or by issuing securities or other liabilities that are 
close substitutes for deposits”. Examples of Other 
Banking Institutions include Savings and Mortgage 
Loan Institutions, Post-Office Savings Institutions, 
Development Banks, and Off-Shore Banking Insti-
tutions. Moreover, Nonbank Financial Institutions 
include institutions such as Insurance Companies, 
Pension Funds, and Superannuation Funds.
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